What's going to happen next: Huge Losses?

I just received one of those alarming emails telling me of the coming Collapse of the U.S. Dollar and a stock market crash unlike ever seen before. It's a fine example of charlatan marketers using their knowledge of investor behavior to get our attention. You know, the ones that include statements intended to get us excited, like:

HUGE LOSSES!

It may be true that some people may once again take on heavy losses, should some of the alarming newsletter writers predictions come to pass. It doesn't seem to be working well so far, because the last one of these I got said to buy silver just days before its 30% decline. But, I can tell you I don't worry about things that haven't happened. A wise man once told me that people spend much of their lives worrying about things that don't ever occur. Because they worry, they experience those things over and over, even though it never happened. That is, you experience the things you fear the most over and over again by worrying about it.

Instead, I suggest you know what you'll do if it does, but don't wait around looking for it. For me, I'll just rotate out of those things that are falling into something that isn't. It's what I do. Predefine your risk by knowing at what exact point you'll exit if it's moving against you. Then, don't worry, be happy!

I take the active management of downside risk seriously as evidenced by my investment performance, and I'm telling you: that's exactly how I do it.

What a family office looks for in a hedge fund portfolio manager

The topic of selecting an investment manager is an important one. Many investors, including professional financial planners and advisors admit they have little skill at selecting asset managers. In fact, some admit they do such a poor job at it they don't even try. But if you understand the value in alternative investment strategies from private equity to absolute return focused investment programs, then you need to know what to look for in an investment manager. These alternative investment strategies are most often offered privately in a private hedge fund format and sometimes offered as a separate managed account (SMA). Whether you are a private individual investor, an allocator for a family office or institution, or a portfolio manager, the video below is an outstanding example of how a sophisticated investor analyzes a money manager. It’s an interview with the Chief Investment Officer of a family office. He explains why a family who sold a large business may be interested in alternative investments or alternative investment strategies rather than conventional public investments and investment programs like mutual funds.  His family office has allocated 80% to alternative investment managers (like hedge funds and the Asymmetry Investment Program™). He offers some insight about:

  • Why family offices (and other wealthy investors) are attracted to alternative investment strategies commonly offered as a private hedge fund.
  • What they specifically look for in selecting a portfolio manager.
  • How allocators filter managers post crisis:  What exactly did you do in 2008?
  • Are they looking at younger emerging hedge fund/money managers?

Click below to view:

 

On how they select hedge funds:  (begins around 4:07/9:57)

We are looking for opportunities with managers were we can get comfortable as to their strategy and what will generate returns for them and what the risks might be? We haven’t been very active with emerging or start-up managers. I think a lot of that has to do with where we are in terms of time.

2008 was an awesome and an awful market experience it's helpful to look at managers who actually were in existence during that period of time to gain some understanding of how they manage their portfolios are the most difficult. Someone doesn't have a 08 track record is much harder to get a sense of how they're going to do a difficult markets. 09 was a pretty easy market to make money if you were long.

How are you evaluating the 2008 period what are you looking at specifically, the drawdown?

We obviously start with performance but  I also want to see exposure in the portfolio. How did the manager navigate those markets? Did he keep his portfolio fully invested in a market environment for his strategy was not allowing it to make money was actually causing losses? Did he trim exposure? When did he put exposure back into the market place?  is something that we look at it. It's really it's a number of different factors we try and I can understand how the manager managed during that period of time and try to gain some insight on his style. Conviction doesn't automatically mean that you stay fully invested at all times. Although we certainly saw a number of managers who waited FAR too long to trim their exposure. So,  it's a combination of all those factors we try and consider. But I would say one of the things that are most important to me is trying to follow a managers gross and net exposures during that period trying to understand. That leads to conversations of what the manager was thinking at the time.

He goes on to say: 

I like analogies. And one of the analogies in 2008 brings to me it’s like a sailor setting his course on a sea. He’s got a great sonar system, he’s got great maps and charts and he’s perhaps got a great GPS so he knows exactly where he is. He knows what's ahead of him in the ocean but his heads down and he’s not seeing these awesomely black storm clouds building up on the horizon are about to come over top of him. Some of those managers we did not stay with. Managers who saw that, who changed course, trimmed their exposure, or sailed to safer territory. One, they survived; they truly preserved capital in difficult times and my benchmark for preserving capital is you had less than a double-digit loss in 08, you get to claim you preserved capital. I've heard people who've lost as much is 25% of investor capital argue that they preserved capital… but I don't believe you can claim that. Understanding how a manager managed and was nimble during a period of time it gives me great comfort, a higher level of comfort, on what a manager may do in the next difficult period. So again it's a it's a very qualitative sort of trying to come to an understanding of what happened… and then make our best guess what we anticipate may happen next time.

 

As a portfolio manager of an alternative investment program I can tell you he's spot on. Those whose jobs are that of the asset allocator, who allocates capital to investment programs, often rely too much on Modern Portfolio Theory statistics and not enough on looking very closely under the hood. As a quantitative trading system developer and operator, we are focusing on far different things and I can tell you: it's the things that matter. It's critical that the investor or allocator take a close look at the downside: how was their drawdown from peak to trough? What were the actual holdings during that time? Like he said: do they stay in the market even when it's not working for them? Or, do they reduce their exposure to the possibility of loss (risk management) by selling positions or dynamic hedging?

I also agree with his comments about experience. After such a radical waterfall occurred in 2008 - 2009, more investors and professionals have now figured out the state of the market. In a secular bear market, such waterfalls occur and it can happen again. After the fact, many investment professionals have scrambled to come up with solutions and naturally they'll be attracted to what actually worked in the past: like some forms of Global Tactical Asset Allocation, Trend Following, and other so-called "alternative" investment strategies like we run. We now have new people interested in active portfolio management that seek an absolute return, rather than a relative return. But like he said: they lack the actual experience. You really don't know how they'll react in the heat of the battle. But you can be assured of this: back-testing a system is one thing, executing is another.

Market Timing Strategies That Worked: in Pursuit of Absolute Return

I'm not a fan of the term "market timing" as I believe it implies some sort of prediction about the market with certainty. The future is unknowable, because it simply doesn't exist. But that's not to say that systems can't have predictive ability in that they result in a positive mathematical expectation (average profits that exceed average loss for a positive return). Nor am I a fan of quantitative indicators that are a derivative of price. That is, I believe any quantitative ratio or indicator that isn't based on the actual price trend can lead to surprising outlier moves because a fundamental valuation indicator can stray far from the price trend itself. For example, if you buy low P/E stocks or stocks you believe are below "intrinsic value", you may at times be proven wrong. That's usually going to happen when stocks become "overvalued" like many thought in the late 1990's, or it happens after a waterfall decline with losses of -50% or more like 2002 or 2008. Relative value measures often flash their warning lights long before a big bubble uptrend is over and they flash buy signals long before a major waterfall crash is finished. These contrarian strategies using "fundamental valuation" aren't just hard to do because they can be wrong for so long, they can also be costly when they stray so far from the actual price trend. I prefer to ride the price trend and it's the price trend itself that is both the judge and the jury; so quantitative price based methods are necessary to exploit directional trends and manage downside risk. But, even though what I say is based on my own experience, empirical evidence, and quantitative research, that isn't to say that the method can't work. I just think there are better ways.

Few investment strategies have a worse reputation than market timing.  Investors are told that their
best strategy in stock investing is a simple “buy-and-hold” strategy: buy a diversified stock market index and
hold it.  Yet most investment literature assumes that investors will hold a security if and only if its expected
return at the market price provides an adequate tradeoff with the risk exposure the security brings.  In other
words, investors are assumed to make their own judgment on whether a security is worth holding. Saying
that investors should not “time the market” is equivalent to saying that consumers should not maximize
utility when making consumption decisions.
1
  The standard reply to this criticism is that because the stock
market is fairly efficient, accurate market timing is very difficult.  In fact, it is said to be so difficult that
investors are better off not trying.
Few investment strategies have a worse reputation than market timing.  Investors are told that their
best strategy in stock investing is a simple “buy-and-hold” strategy: buy a diversified stock market index and
hold it.  Yet most investment literature assumes that investors will hold a security if and only if its expected
return at the market price provides an adequate tradeoff with the risk exposure the security brings.  In other
words, investors are assumed to make their own judgment on whether a security is worth holding. Saying
that investors should not “time the market” is equivalent to saying that consumers should not maximize
utility when making consumption decisions.
1
  The standard reply to this criticism is that because the stock
market is fairly efficient, accurate market timing is very difficult.  In fact, it is said to be so difficult that
investors are better off not trying.

With that said, Pu Shen, an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, wrote an interesting paper titled "Market Timing Strategies That Worked" in 2002. He studied switching strategies based on a simple relative valuation that signaled when stocks may be overvalued or undervalued. He concludes:

We find that switching strategies outperformed the market index in the sense that they provide higher mean returns and lower variances.

Our resarch suggests that it may be possible to use a simple rule of thumb to avoid some of the market downturns and improve upon the widely preached buy and hold strategy. 

In that case, so much for the "You can't beat the market" mantra. He finds that 4 of the 5 strategies he studies outperformed the S&P 500 stock index with less risk, even after factoring in transaction costs. In the opening paragraphs, he says:

Few investment strategies have a worse reputation than market timing. Investors are told that their best strategy in stock investing is a simple “buy-and-hold” strategy: buy a diversified stock market index and hold it. Yet most investment literature assumes that investors will hold a security if and only if its expected return at the market price provides an adequate tradeoff with the risk exposure the security brings. In other words, investors are assumed to make their own judgment on whether a security is worth holding. Saying that investors should not “time the market” is equivalent to saying that consumers should not  maximize utility when making consumption decisions.

The standard reply to this criticism is that because the stock market is fairly efficient, accurate market timing is very difficult. In fact, it is said to be so difficult that investors are better off not trying.

I guess that pretty much speaks for itself.

I will add that everyone has an agenda. The objective for someone switching or rotating capital between cash, stocks, bonds, commodities, and currencies is to avoid large losses when any of those markets are trending down and profit from their positive directional trends. In other words, it's a pursuit of profit > loss. The buy and hold investors he speaks of pursue market returns, which anyone can get in low cost passive index funds. We don't need any advice, tactical portfolio management, or active risk management, or even skill, to get market returns. If it's market returns they want: they buy and hold the index. If they feel the market returns have too large of losses and/or too little reward, then a tactical rotation may be necessary. In other words, if the market indices haven't provided the risk/reward profile a person needs, then they may need to extract from those indices the parts they want with a quantitative system of some kind that has a mathmatical basis behind it. 

It's pretty clear that the person pursuing an active rotational strategy is "doing something" toward achieving his or her objectives. So, I can't argue too much against any strategy that's at least pursuing the same rational goals as me. By definition, a rational person is one who "does something" in pursuit of bettering circumstances. A non-rational person is one who doesn't. People often ask me why so much of the investment industry seems to promote passive strategies like "buy and hold". I don't necessarily think "most" of the industry does do that- I think it's mainly the retail broker/advisor and mutual fund companies who do. Again, it's probably a function of their agenda. You see, the mutual fund only gets paid if you keep your money in their fund, so their agenda is to keep you buying and holding. And they mostly remain fully invested no matter how much the market goes down. It would be irrational for them to tell you to sell their fund, ever. So, they come up with all kinds of spin in attempt to get you to hold their fund. Then, there are the retail broker financial advisors. Each of them probably have their own reasons for asset allocating, but not rotating even when the market is moving against them. We know that trade commissions is not longer a reason: we can now buy and sell Exchange Traded Funds (ETF) for free at many brokers. In reality, developing and operating robust tactical rotational strategies that have a positive mathematical expectation requires a lot of different skills and those skills are absolutely uncommon. Indeed, I know of fellow portfolio managers who've been trying for years with no success if we define it as good performance results over a full market cycle

But, those who think it isn't possible, or who can't do it themselves, shouldn't interupt those who are...

 

Drawing a Line in the Sand for Investment Objectives

It is useful to draw distinctions between things. In this image, I differentiate between investment objectives and the theory or strategy underlining them. 

Investment Objectives.bmp

 

We could add a lot to this. We could say that index tracking Exchange Traded Funds are the security of choice for the Efficient Market Theorist and Rational Market Theorist, who asset allocate: buy and hold passive indices. Their aim is to get the market index risk and return (beta) - good or bad. Of course, that's not to say an absolute return manager like myself doesn't use the same securities - I do. The difference in an absolute return objective that seeks to carve out more profit than loss is active risk management through tactical rotation to increase and decrease exposure to the possibility of loss. The objective of earning a profit and avoiding large losses requires one to think independently of any specific benchmark or index. Instead, the absolute return manager is focused on a process that pursues a positive asymmetric outcome with strategies, markets, and securities most likely to achieve it. And then, one could relate a investment product like mutual funds to the "relative return" oriented folks who try to beat a market index through "stock picking" or investment selection, even though it's the exit, not the entry, that creates the result.  Feel free to add to it as you wish by commenting below...

No matter how much we add to it, you can probably see how this simple continuum shows how our objectives guide our beliefs and the strategies we choose to operate. 

The Big Boys? Does Size Matter in Portfolio Management?

In a meeting recently someone commented about "the big boys". He was referring to the largest fund companies, implying that they may know or do something others don't. Remembering that the Morningstar website has an interesting section called "Fund Family Data Pages", I pulled them up. But first, I did a search to find a list of the largest fund companies. I then pulled up those fund companies "Data Page" on the Morningstar website and said "are these the big boys you mean"? Agreeing, we did a little discovery with some of the largest fund companies.

One of the largest fund companies is the American Funds. I've heard before that the American Funds are some of the most sold mutual funds in the country (maybe that's why they call them American?) by brokers. Anyway, they are a very large fund company with $892 billion in their funds according to the snapshot below taken from the Morningstar website. However, in 2007 they had over a trillion in their funds. The -33.4% loss in 2008 depleted some of that. The return numbers you see below are the asset weighted returns for the fund company. That is, the annual return is the total gain or loss for all the fund companies' asset under management. in addition to highlighting the magnitude of the losses this giant fund company created, the table also points out the asymmetric nature of losses. Notice that the annual loss they created In 2008 was -33.4% and the following year they had a 29% gain. However, look at the chart. It speaks for itself. Their funds are far from their 2007 level. Over the past 5 years, their total return is only 3.08%. You may also notice this includes about 12% of their total assets in bonds.

American Funds 8-23-2010 7-22-56 PM.bmp

Source: http://quicktake.morningstar.com/FundFamily/Snapshot.asp?Country=USA&Symbol=10139

 

The next giant fund family we look at is Vanguard, the largest index fund seller. They have more than $1.2 trillion in assets, but does that mean they are any good? Vanguard has more than 32% of their assets in bonds, so their total mix is more balanced. Their calendar year loss was -26.4%, even with the heavy bond mix. Even with the strong stock market recover in 2009, they remain far from their highs nearly 3 years ago. In fact, they've lost on average -1.46% a year over the past 3 years and they've achieved a return of only 3.33% over the past 5 years. That is, they've earned barely more than 3% average and experienced a -26.4% loss along the way. That's not the kind of asymmetry we want. Daniel Kahneman won the Nobel Prize for his Prospect Theory which shows that investors prefer less downside, more upside. None of the super large fund companies have achieved that objective; their drawdown's (losses) are very large and their returns poor going back several years.

Vanguard 8-23-2010 7-26-50 PM.bmp

Source: http://quicktake.morningstar.com/FundFamily/Snapshot.asp?Country=USA&Symbol=10740

Fidelity Investments is the next fund company we take a look at. It's the same story. They have less bond funds, so their losses where larger at -34.5%. Keep in mind, that is unlikely their total loss from the highest high of the market (October 2007) to the lowest low (March 2009). The -34.5% loss only accounts for the calendar year 2008. The S&P 500 declined nearly 30% from January 2009 to the March 2009 low, so you can imagine what the total drawdown must have been for these funds. However, to determine that would require us to look at the individual charts of their funds since that level of detail isn't available on the site we are using. That is beyond the scope of this article. Fidelity's assets declined $400 billion from 2007 to 2008. Their 5 year average return is 2.79%.

 

Fidelity 8-23-2010 7-25-20 PM.bmp

 

Well, that pretty much sums in up. The large fund companies fail to produce the kind of asymmetric returns that many investors seek. That is, unless you believe a -30% loss matches up with a 3% average return. These fund companies have an objective of "relative return", so their objective isn't to create a positive imbalance between risk and reward, but instead their object is to outperform a benchmark. You can probably see how these poor returns may actually be getting exactly what they want.

If you would like to take a look at more fund companies, go to the link below, and then scroll down the page to "Fund Family Research Data" and then "Fund Family Data Pages".

http://www.morningstar.com/Cover/Funds.aspx

A funny thing, fund companies are supposed to add a disclaimer after public comments about their funds. It goes like this: Investors should consider the investment objectives, risks, charges and expenses of this Fund carefully before investing. I suggest people may consider actually doing that. This obviously isn't a recommendation to buy or sell these funds.

Benchmark-itis! Who Wants to Track This?

 

We hear people talking a lot about stock indices like the S&P 500 stock index, referring to the index more than just a proxy for stocks, but also an investment. What you see below is a monthly chart of the past 10 years for the S&P 500 stock index. It is an index that many investment managers benchmark. I look at this chart, and I wonder; Who wants this?
 

Ten Year Chart of the S&P 500 Stock Index

S&P 500 Stock Index 10 Years 6-6-2010 5-13-34 PM

Chart courtesy of eSignal

 

In August 2000 the S&P 500 index was as high as 1,525. On Friday, it closed at 1,064. This index is down -43% from were it was ten years ago. (1065 - 1525) / 1064 = -43%. We could say the same about its more recent high point in October 2007.

At Shell Capital, we don't benchmark indexes. Our objective is to earn as much profit as we can with a specific amount of absolute risk. We call this "absolute return" rather than "relative return". We do not have benchmark-itis and we avoid relativity.

 

Benchmark-itis! Who Wants to Track This?

We hear people talking a lot about stock indices like the S&P 500 stock index, referring to the index more than just a proxy for stocks, but also an investment. What you see below is a monthly chart of the past 10 years for the S&P 500 stock index. It is an index that many investment managers benchmark. I look at this chart, and I wonder; Who wants this?

Ten Year Chart of the S&P 500 Stock Index

S&P 500 Stock Index 10 Years 6-6-2010 5-13-34 PM

Chart courtesy of eSignal

In August 2000 the S&P 500 index was as high as 1,525. On Friday, it closed at 1,064. This index is down -43% from were it was ten years ago. (1065 - 1525) / 1064 = -43%. We could say the same about its more recent high point in October 2007.

At Shell Capital, we don't benchmark indexes. Our objective is to earn as much profit as we can with a specific amount of absolute risk. We call this "absolute return" rather than "relative return". We do not have benchmark-itis and we avoid relativity.

A Follow Up on the Stock Market... and a Word on Loss Traps and Risk Management

As a follow up with yesterday's comment "Drawing the Line in the Sand for the Stock Market: A Look at the S&P 500 Index Trend "... so far, so good. As you can see in the chart below, the February lows held today. The stock indexes were down 2-3% most of the day. But by the day's end, the selling pressure dried up. The index closed very close to yesterdays closing price. For those who are looking for a reversal up, you "may" be in luck soon. I say this because of today's price action.

If you look at the blue arrows, those are called a "Hammer" on a candlestick chart. The Hammer is a common bullish reversal pattern that forms after a decline. It's common enough that a Hammer marked the February low. In addition to a potential trend reversal, hammers can mark bottoms as it did in February. The height of the candle shows the wide high to low price range that traded today as sellers drove prices lower during the session but buyers stepped in at the end of the day and took over. Hammers are similar to selling climaxes. We'll want to see confirmation, which could be a gap up in the days ahead. For prices to reverse back up, the selling pressure that drove it down simply needs to be overwhelmed by buying demand. For that to occur, prices have got to get to a low enough level to attract buying interest.

SPX Hammer 5-25-2010 6-19-38 PM

 Chart courtesy of eSignal Pro

Times like these can be very difficult for the passive investors who remain fully invested all the time. They are caught in a loss trap and don't know for sure how long it may last or how deep the losses may get. If the current price range does not hold support (the red highlighted area on the chart) and reverse up, the pressure will get stronger and stronger as their losses mount. There is also a possibility that stocks could reverse up for a few days or weeks and then reverse down to eventually break the February lows. From that point, it could keep going to the March 2009. Anything is possible. This is why, at Shell Capital Management we actively manage our risk by increasing and decreasing exposure to the possibility of loss... When prices are peaking out or start reversing down and volatility is rising, we exit weak positions systematically to reduce our exposure to loss. The market isn't the risk. The risk is the exposure. If we have no exposure, we have no risk. Our risk control system is a huge advantage for us. It allows us to control our risk to a maximum amount we're willing to take as we aim for capital gains. You see, we can't fully hedge or eliminate our risk all the time and expect to earn a profit. We aren't unwilling to take any risk at all. We must employ "some" risk in order to have profit potential. In order to earn a profit, we need exposure to some degree at some point. What we do differently is control the "degree of exposure" and the "point". We only want exposure when the odds are overwhelmingly in our favor. We do it by buying and selling things...

 

As it turns out, we have something in common with many of the most famous investors in the world. The following statement was written by Warren Buffett in a 2003 "Letter to the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway".

 

When we can’t find anything exciting in which to invest, our “default” position is U.S. Treasuries, ... Charlie and I detest taking even small risks unless we feel we are being adequately compensated for doing so. About as far as we will go down that path is to occasionally eat cottage cheese a day after the expiration date on the carton.*

It appears that Mr. Buffett, like us, has an objective of absolute returns ...

We like avoiding large losses on our portfolio (as defined by -15% or more). We like not having to "worry" if this Hammer is indeed a setup for a reversal, or not. We reduce our exposure to loss to an acceptable level and then go with the flow...

 *Source: http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2003ltr.pdf