Asymmetric Contests with Conditional Investments
This is a paper put out by Ron Siegel at Northwestern University. It not exactly using "asymmetric" in the way we typically discuss here, but I like to learn about all kinds of asymmetries.
...the difference in a player’s payoff between winning and losing may depend on his chosen score. This accommodates a combination of unconditional and conditional investments. The primitives of the model are commonly known, capturing players’ knowledge of the asymmetries among them.
Abstract
This paper studies equilibrium behavior in a class of games that models asymmetric competitions with unconditional and conditional investments. Such competitions include lobbying settings, labor-market tournaments, and R&D races, among others. I provide an algorithm that constructs the unique equilibrium in these games, and apply it to study competitions in which a fraction of each competitor’s investment is sunk and the rest is paid only by the winners. Complete-information all-pay auctions are a special case.
Source: http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~rsi665/acwci.pdf
