S&P 500 Index Inflection Points of the Current Secular Bear Market

Individual investors should consider taking a close look at the chart below of the stock index since 1996. You don't know what it is going to do next, but you can probably see what kind of strategy is more likely to provide you with asymmetry of returns. For more information about long term market cycles, read: Seasons and Cycles of the Stock Market.

 

S&P 500 Index at Inflection Points.jpg

Source: Standard & Poor’s, First Call, Compustat, FactSet, J.P. Morgan Asset Management.

Dividend yield is calculated as the annualized dividend rate divided by price, as provided by Compustat. Forward Price to Earnings Ratio is a bottom-up calculation based on the most recent S&P 500 Index price, divided by consensus estimates for earnings in the next twelve months (NTM), and is provided by FactSet Market Aggregates. Returns are cumulative and based on S&P 500 Index price movement only, and do not include the reinvestment of dividends. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

Stock Index Performance for 2011 and the Full Market Cycle

As 2011 is in the past and the new year is here, there is always a lot of talk about the prior year as well as predictions about the year ahead. If you believe you know the outcome in advance of a time that doesn't yet exist, go ahead and make your prediction and your bets. Even talking about a calendar year in the past isn't of much use unless you were trading your way to a new car, home, or yacht and December 31, 2011 was your deadline. I believe the best time frame is a full market cycle that includes up and down periods. Those who don't understand investment results are created over complete cycles probably find themselves earning big gains that are later wiped out by large losses, over and over again. The pursuit of an asymmetric return profile necessarily requires the capture of some of the upside and then the avoidance of some of the downside. It's the capture of more of one than the other. With that said, we view the past stock market performance history using the Russell broad market indices. Nevertheless, below is a table of the typical format of presenting a performance profile. In the table we show the calendar year but also include longer periods to include the more important full market cycle (5 years or longer). The definitions for the indices are at the bottom of this post. 

Index Name 2011 5 Years 10 Years Index Style
Russell 3000 1.03 -0.01 3.51 Broad-Market Indexes
Russell 1000 1.5 -0.02 3.34 Large-Cap Indexes
Russell Midcap -1.55 1.41 6.99 Mid-Cap Indexes
Russell 2000 -4.18 0.15 5.62 Small-Cap Indexes
Russell Microcap -9.27 -3.75 4.63 Small-Cap Indexes

Source: Rusell Return and value data utilized in this calculation tool comes from sources believed to be reliable but is neither guaranteed nor warranted and is subject to revision without notice

 

A picture speaks a thousand words. Below is the price chart of some of the broad stock market indices that represent the performance of stocks of companies of different sizes: small, mid, and large company stocks. Stocks broadly started 2011 in a rising price trend. The year was filled with negative headlines and fear. The stocks indices declined around -20% very quickly late summer and then recovered those losses to close the year at about the price they started. One useful thing about viewing price charts this way is we can see the visual representation of the path along the way, not just the ending point. The calendar year range for these broad indices was -9% to 1.5%. Stocks were "flat" if we look at the average, but that doesn't present the experience during the year. In the chart, we can note the highest high, the lowest low, and the distance between the high and low (the draw-down) along the way. You can probably see how stock investors probably oscillated between the fear of missing out and the fear of losing money in such a volatile period. 

Russell stock index returns 2011.jpg

Source: http://stockcharts.com/freecharts/perf.html?$RUT,$rui,$rua,$rmc, 

 

Looking at these stock market indices over a full market cycle (a period typically 5-6 years that includes both rising and declining price trends) we see the performance profile of stocks that include both gains and losses. Performance tables do not present "investment returns" appropriately because they only illustrate the end result for a period, but not the path or the worse draw-down along the way. In the price chart below, we get a visual representation for the most recent market cycles. Since April 2005, these stock indices gained a total 10 - 25%, or and average of only 1-4% annually.  From that starting point, they were up over 40% at one point (October 2007) and then declined over -50% by March 2009. The smallest stocks recovered their declines is the 100% gain it takes to recover from a -50% loss. The majority of the stock market, mid and large companies, are still far from their previous highs with the broadest index, the Russell 3000 (green line) gaining only about 10% over the entire period. While these price charts don't include dividends, they also don't include any costs. As we have illustrated both the risk and reward over the most recent full market cycle, you may agree that the stock market by itself has not presented the kind of asymmetric investment returns that meets most investors' objectives. In fact, applying a conventional asset allocation with annual reblancing to a broad mix of stocks and bonds doesn't create the kind of asymmetric profile many investors want. It's important to understand long term (secular) trends and Seasons and Cycles of the Stock Market.

Russell Stock index returns over a full market cycle.jpg

 

Index Definitions (Source: Russell Investments)

The Russell 3000 Index measures the performance of the largest 3000 U.S. companies representing approximately 98% of the investable U.S. equity market.  The Russell 3000 Index is constructed to provide a comprehensive, unbiased, and stable barometer of the broad market and is completely reconstituted annually to ensure new and growing equities are reflected.

The Russell 1000 Index measures the performance of the large-cap segment of the U.S. equity universe. It is a subset of the Russell 3000® Index and includes approximately 1000 of the largest securities based on a combination of their market cap and current index membership. The Russell 1000 represents approximately 92% of the U.S. market. The Russell 1000 Index is constructed to provide a comprehensive and unbiased barometer for the large-cap segment and is completely reconstituted annually to ensure new and growing equities are reflected

The Russell Midcap Index measures the performance of the mid-cap segment of the U.S. equity universe. The Russell Midcap is a subset of the Russell 1000® Index. It includes approximately 800 of the smallest securities based on a combination of their market cap and current index membership. The Russell Midcap represents approximately 31% of the total market capitalization of the Russell 1000 companies. The Russell Midcap Index is constructed to provide a comprehensive and unbiased barometer for the mid-cap segment. The Index is completely reconstituted annually to ensure larger stocks do not distort the performance and characteristics of the true mid-cap opportunity set.

The Russell 2000 Index measures the performance of the small-cap segment of the U.S. equity universe. The Russell 2000 is a subset of the Russell 3000® Index representing approximately 10% of the total market capitalization of that index. It includes approximately 2000 of the smallest securities based on a combination of their market cap and current index membership. The Russell 2000 Index is constructed to provide a comprehensive and unbiased small-cap barometer and is completely reconstituted annually to ensure larger stocks do not distort the performance and characteristics of the true small-cap opportunity set.

The Russell Microcap Index measures the performance of the microcap segment of the U.S. equity market. Microcap stocks make up less than 3% of the U.S. equity market (by market cap) and consist of the smallest 1,000 securities in the small-cap Russell 2000® Index, plus the next smallest eligible securities by market cap. The Russell Microcap Index is constructed to provide a comprehensive and unbiased barometer for the microcap segment trading on national exchanges, while excluding lesser-regulated OTC bulletin board securities and pink-sheet stocks due to their failure to meet national exchange listing requirements. The Russell Microcap is completely reconstituted annually to ensure larger stocks do not distort performance and characteristics of the true microcap opportunity set.

PAST PERFORMANCE IS NO GUARANTEE OF FUTURE RESULTS.

Seasons and Cycles of the Stock Market

By guest contributor Ed Easterling

Although the weather can seem fairly random from day to day, the weekly and monthly patterns are driven by the overriding impact of the seasons. Likewise, the stock market has long-term “secular” cycles driven by the fundamentals of finance and short-term “cyclical” cycles within these secular cycles.

Because the market movements often appear random, conventional wisdom assumes a random walk for the market.

Yet conventional wisdom too often includes shortcuts that create blinders to insight. Whether you invest or trade, an understanding of the cycles and their implications can be invaluable toward financial success.

Secular Cycles

Secular stock market cycles are extended periods of above-average returns (secular bull markets) and below-average returns (secular bear markets). Just like seasons of the weather, these secular cycles are not coincidental patterns or long-term phenomena; rather, these periods are caused by fundamental drivers of returns.

Why does this matter to a trader or investor? An understanding of the patterns and drivers can greatly enhance success in the market. The market is not a random pattern of results or a simple game of chance, such as flipping a coin or spinning the roulette wheel.

In games of chance, the odds are known and are unaffected by previous events or current conditions.

The market more closely relates to a game of skill, where past events and current conditions actually affect future results. This article should help you to “count the cards” in the market to know when it is winter or summer and to know when to fade a winter warm spell or lean into the emerging spring.

Fundamental Drivers

If returns in the market were occurring randomly over time, then 10-year periods in the stock market would presumably show relatively random results. However, Figure 1 presents quite a different pattern.

It undulates from below-average to above-average. The chart reflects all 10-year periods since 1900: the first is 1900 to 1909, then 1901 to 1910 and so on. Each bar is the average compounded return including dividends during every 10-year period since 1900. The pattern clearly is not random, and it is driven primarily by the significant factor of market valuation.

Figure 1. S&P 500 Index Total Returns By Decades

10year-rolling-stock-market-return.png

Key Components

To understand a multifaceted situation, it is sometimes helpful to break it into the component parts. Stock market returns consist of three parts: earnings growth, dividend yield and the change in the price-to-earnings ratio (P/E).

The growth of earnings represents the core driver of stock market appreciation. As the earnings of companies increase over time, the value of companies tends to increase. If P/E (the valuation multiple of the market) stays the same, then the stock price (or overall market) will increase consistently with earnings growth.

But the stock market often increases by more than earnings growth or, at times, declines despite earnings growth. In these instances, respectively, earnings growth is multiplied by an increase in P/E or offset by a decrease in P/E.

The Big Picture

The price/earnings ratio for the overall market is developed by dividing a price index by the aggregate earnings of companies in the index. P/E is a valuation multiple because it essentially reflects the number of years worth of earnings that investors will pay today for a future stream of income from stocks.

When inflation and interest rates are high, investors want higher returns, so they pay a lower price upfront for stocks. When deflation occurs, future income and dividends reflect a declining deflationary trend, so investors pay lower prices here, too.

Only in conditions when inflation is low and stable do investors pay higher P/Es for stocks. Therefore, trends in inflation or deflation drive P/Es through a cycle of higher and lower levels.

Because P/E is a multiplier of earnings growth, a rising trend in P/E can often double or triple the level of return from earnings growth. A declining trend in P/E, however, can offset some or all of the benefit from earnings growth.

Beyond the return that is driven by earnings growth and the change in P/E, an investor also receives dividends from a portfolio of stocks. So dividends add a final component to the total return from the stock market.

What’s the Cycle?

The key point, as detailed in the book Unexpected Returns: Understanding Secular Stock Market Cycles, is to recognize that the cycle in P/E drives the secular stock market cycles. As earnings tend to grow over time, a rising P/E will multiply earnings growth and drive above-average returns. A decline in P/E will offset earnings growth and deliver below-average returns.

The impact of the price/earnings ratio on the stock market is reflected in Figure 2. The red and green bars represent the year-end level of the market; the colors of the bars represent secular bear and secular bull cycles, respectively. The blue line on the bottom of the graph is P/E. As it rises, we experience green-bar, secular bull market periods. As P/E falls, we experience red-bar, secular bear market periods.

Figure 2. Secular Stock Market Cycles Explained

secular-stock-markets-explained.png

Most noteworthy, the pattern of P/E is not random…and the red-bar and green-bar periods are not random.

The price pattern for secular bull markets is a generally rising stock market driven by an increase in earnings and an increase in P/Es. The price pattern for secular bear markets is a generally choppy stock market driven by an increase in earnings and a decrease in P/Es.

Implications for Trading

For long-term investors, a multi-year and multi-decade perspective is often sufficient, especially when the environment is a green-bar, secular bull market. But for traders and curious investors, a look inside a typical secular bear market can be revealing.

For example, although the Himalaya Mountains may appear to be little hills from an airplane flying over them, the terrain is quite different for someone taking each step on the ground.

The red-bar, secular bear market of the 1960s and 1970s in Figure 2 appears muted across a century of time. Yet the daily, trail-worn path “feels” quite different.

Another View

Figure 3 reflects the dramatic short-term cyclical bull and bear cycles that occur throughout the longer secular bear market period. The magnitude of the swings, presented as percentages between peaks and troughs, is much more significant than most people expect.

Figure 3. Living Through The Last Secular Bear Market

living-through-last-secular-bear.png

Additionally, the relatively short periods for the cyclical bulls and bears further multiplies the drama.

The investment approach employed not only by investors, but also particularly by traders, should adjust to the different conditions of secular bulls and secular bears.

Whether your strategy is long- or short-biased, each of the secular market animals presents a unique environment of challenges and opportunities. Secular bear markets, with their repeatedly changing and erratic short-term cycles, pose especially challenging conditions. However, one trader’s challenge is another’s opportunity.

Outlook for the Next Few Years

In chapter five of Reminiscences of a Stock Operator by Edwin Lefèvre, the stalwart sage Mr. Partridge has a jousting exchange with investment newbie Elmer Harwood.

Harwood was focused only on the current stock trade; Partridge’s many years of experience taught him not to ignore the overall trend. Harwood would ultimately learn, while Partridge would profit.

The underlying conditions of the market were as relevant a century ago as they are today. But today, unlike the secular bull market of the 1920s, we are in the middle of a secular bear market that started in 2000.

For the remainder of this secular bear—which can be expected to last many more years—we can expect a couple or several years of surges punctuated by a year or two of decline.

While inflation remains relatively low and P/Es are commensurately high, the fundamentals are not in place to enable P/Es to double or triple to generate the next secular bull market.

The pattern will be frustrating for those who are not aware of it, yet rewarding for those who see the opportunities.

The secular bear roller coaster reflected in Figure 3 emphasizes the need to stay aware of the current normalized P/E. After the first quarter of 2010, P/E is in the lower end of the typical valuation range for relatively low inflation environments.

Crestmont Research updates quarterly, or more often as warranted, a complimentary assessment of the current state of P/E in the Stock Market section of its website. For now, the short-term cyclical bull has momentum; within quarters or years, another short-term bear will likely add another punctuation point to the current longer-term secular bear market.

The Seasons

For thousands of years, early man observed a pattern of seasons—from winter to spring, then on to summer, and concluding with fall. For many millenniums, seasons were a constant, though unexplained, pattern. At times, a warm day in the middle of winter would be confused with the beginning of spring. Farmers would run out and plant crops, only to be nipped by the continuation of winter.

Then about 500 years ago, astronomers determined that the tilt of the Earth caused the seasons. Suddenly they knew that summer cannot start in the middle of winter, no matter how long the warm spell persists. As a matter of fact, as the winter warm spell extends beyond a few days, the likelihood of a return to cold increases.

During winter, there are significant implications for farming. A few warm days are now known to be temporary, so savvy farmers know not to plant the summer crop too early. Most of all, success in these periods requires a more active, greenhouse approach or the planting of unique winter crops.

Be Nimble

During winter-like secular bear markets, investors and traders will not have the extended multi-year secular bull runs to rely upon. Market conditions will deliver intermittent, short-term cyclical bulls and bears, requiring a more nimble, hedged and actively managed approach to investing and trading.

A note from Mike Shell: You can probably see why we pursue asymmetric investment returns through global tactical rotation. If you still aren't convinced that market cycles exist, I encourage you to read Ed’s books.

Has the market changed?

On this day, October 24, in 1929: Today is Black Thursday the first taste of the Great Crash. At the opening bell, 150,000 shares of Cities Service, the oil company, trade hands for $8.4 million, the largest block trade of stock ever yet recorded. By 10:30 a.m., even the blue-chip stocks are dropping $5 to $10 with each trade, and the ticker tape is running 16 minutes late. By lunchtime, RCA is down 35%, and Montgomery Ward has nose-dived 39.9%. Then a bankers' pool" is formed to put a floor under the plunging market. At 1:30 Richard Whitney president of the New York Stock Exchange and lead broker for J.P. Morgan & Co. marches up to the trading post for U.S. Steel and bids $205 for 25000 shares. That's $10 higher than the last bid and the panic breaks. Still the Dow closes down 2.1% on record volume of 12.895 million shares. The bull market of the 1920s is about to end and the Great Depression is waiting in the wings."


Source: Barrie A. Wigmore, The Crash and Its Aftermath: A History of Securities Markets in the United States, 1929-1933 (Greenwood Press, Westport, CT and London, 1985), pp. 6-11; John Brooks, Once in Golconda: A True Drama of Wall Street, 1920-1938 (Harper & Row, New York, 1969), pp. 124-125; Phyllis S. Pierce, ed., The Dow Jones Averages 1885-1980 (DowJones Irwin, Homewood, IL, 1982), not paginated; http://www.djindexes.com

Probable Outcomes by Ed Easterling

This is the book you've got to read to understand longer term (secular) price trends and why it's crucial to pursue active risk management and absolute return strategies. It's why we do what we do.

probable outcomes.jpg

 

It is uncommon for research of this caliber to be shared with the world. I wrote a review on Easterling's first book "Unexpected Returns" in 2005, which is absolutely essential reading for all investors. In fact, we've long since given copies to our investors to read and I've used it for training other portfolio managers. Probable Outcomes is kind of a sequel to Unexpected Returns and once again: it's an essential update. It's crucial for investors to understand the state of the long term trends. Easterling warned in his 2005 book: passive buy and hold strategies are likely to cause pain to your wallet. And it did. Eastlerling provides the likely course for the stock market this decade giving investors well informed expectations. I strongly recommend it so you understand the possibilities and why it's crucial to pursue active risk management and tactics to row, not sail. The history already speaks for itself for those who were prepared. What I said in the 2005 Amazon.com review of Unexpected Returns still holds true today and is probably more obvious:

Traditional "buy and hold" relative return strategies rely on the direction of the markets. They enjoy gains when they occur, suffer loses when the market declines, and require a long time horizon that many investors don't have. Skill-based tactical strategies seek gains regardless of market direction using investment manager skill in sector rotation, hedging strategies, and risk management. As Ed says in the book, when the wind is blowing we can let out the sails and enjoy the ride. When the wind stops blowing, you can sit there and wait for the wind to come again, or you can get out the oars and start rowing. Based on current technical and fundamental research, it seems the wind may not cast our sails and the oars are now necessary to get where we want to go.

What a family office looks for in a hedge fund portfolio manager

The topic of selecting an investment manager is an important one. Many investors, including professional financial planners and advisors admit they have little skill at selecting asset managers. In fact, some admit they do such a poor job at it they don't even try. But if you understand the value in alternative investment strategies from private equity to absolute return focused investment programs, then you need to know what to look for in an investment manager. These alternative investment strategies are most often offered privately in a private hedge fund format and sometimes offered as a separate managed account (SMA). Whether you are a private individual investor, an allocator for a family office or institution, or a portfolio manager, the video below is an outstanding example of how a sophisticated investor analyzes a money manager. It’s an interview with the Chief Investment Officer of a family office. He explains why a family who sold a large business may be interested in alternative investments or alternative investment strategies rather than conventional public investments and investment programs like mutual funds.  His family office has allocated 80% to alternative investment managers (like hedge funds and the Asymmetry Investment Program™). He offers some insight about:

  • Why family offices (and other wealthy investors) are attracted to alternative investment strategies commonly offered as a private hedge fund.
  • What they specifically look for in selecting a portfolio manager.
  • How allocators filter managers post crisis:  What exactly did you do in 2008?
  • Are they looking at younger emerging hedge fund/money managers?

Click below to view:

 

On how they select hedge funds:  (begins around 4:07/9:57)

We are looking for opportunities with managers were we can get comfortable as to their strategy and what will generate returns for them and what the risks might be? We haven’t been very active with emerging or start-up managers. I think a lot of that has to do with where we are in terms of time.

2008 was an awesome and an awful market experience it's helpful to look at managers who actually were in existence during that period of time to gain some understanding of how they manage their portfolios are the most difficult. Someone doesn't have a 08 track record is much harder to get a sense of how they're going to do a difficult markets. 09 was a pretty easy market to make money if you were long.

How are you evaluating the 2008 period what are you looking at specifically, the drawdown?

We obviously start with performance but  I also want to see exposure in the portfolio. How did the manager navigate those markets? Did he keep his portfolio fully invested in a market environment for his strategy was not allowing it to make money was actually causing losses? Did he trim exposure? When did he put exposure back into the market place?  is something that we look at it. It's really it's a number of different factors we try and I can understand how the manager managed during that period of time and try to gain some insight on his style. Conviction doesn't automatically mean that you stay fully invested at all times. Although we certainly saw a number of managers who waited FAR too long to trim their exposure. So,  it's a combination of all those factors we try and consider. But I would say one of the things that are most important to me is trying to follow a managers gross and net exposures during that period trying to understand. That leads to conversations of what the manager was thinking at the time.

He goes on to say: 

I like analogies. And one of the analogies in 2008 brings to me it’s like a sailor setting his course on a sea. He’s got a great sonar system, he’s got great maps and charts and he’s perhaps got a great GPS so he knows exactly where he is. He knows what's ahead of him in the ocean but his heads down and he’s not seeing these awesomely black storm clouds building up on the horizon are about to come over top of him. Some of those managers we did not stay with. Managers who saw that, who changed course, trimmed their exposure, or sailed to safer territory. One, they survived; they truly preserved capital in difficult times and my benchmark for preserving capital is you had less than a double-digit loss in 08, you get to claim you preserved capital. I've heard people who've lost as much is 25% of investor capital argue that they preserved capital… but I don't believe you can claim that. Understanding how a manager managed and was nimble during a period of time it gives me great comfort, a higher level of comfort, on what a manager may do in the next difficult period. So again it's a it's a very qualitative sort of trying to come to an understanding of what happened… and then make our best guess what we anticipate may happen next time.

 

As a portfolio manager of an alternative investment program I can tell you he's spot on. Those whose jobs are that of the asset allocator, who allocates capital to investment programs, often rely too much on Modern Portfolio Theory statistics and not enough on looking very closely under the hood. As a quantitative trading system developer and operator, we are focusing on far different things and I can tell you: it's the things that matter. It's critical that the investor or allocator take a close look at the downside: how was their drawdown from peak to trough? What were the actual holdings during that time? Like he said: do they stay in the market even when it's not working for them? Or, do they reduce their exposure to the possibility of loss (risk management) by selling positions or dynamic hedging?

I also agree with his comments about experience. After such a radical waterfall occurred in 2008 - 2009, more investors and professionals have now figured out the state of the market. In a secular bear market, such waterfalls occur and it can happen again. After the fact, many investment professionals have scrambled to come up with solutions and naturally they'll be attracted to what actually worked in the past: like some forms of Global Tactical Asset Allocation, Trend Following, and other so-called "alternative" investment strategies like we run. We now have new people interested in active portfolio management that seek an absolute return, rather than a relative return. But like he said: they lack the actual experience. You really don't know how they'll react in the heat of the battle. But you can be assured of this: back-testing a system is one thing, executing is another.

The Swings in a Secular Bear Market Are Much More Dramatic Than Most Investors Realize

The following chart is from my friend Ed Easterling at www.CrestmontResearch.com. I'm proud to say I was one of the very first to read and comment on Ed's book back in 2005: "Unexpected Returns". Prior to 2005, we had completed extensive research on historical Secular and Cyclical Bull and Bear Markets. Primarily, I had studied the trends going back over 100 years and tested tactical systems across those various trends. Our conclusion was that long term (Secular) Bull and Bear market's had occurred over and over throughout history. When Ed came out with his research in his book, we compared notes. His work was more focused on why Secular trends occur and under what circumstances. "Unexpected Returns" is a necessary study to understand the big picture. I can tell you that it was my understanding of market trends that motivated us to create the money management systems we benefited from the past five years. You can probably see how the timing of Secular situation correlates with our tactical asset management style - we built the Ark before the flood.

Though we studied and tested decision-making systems on much more detailed data, I thought I would show what these trends look like. Clearly, the U.S. stock market has been in a Secular Bear Market for a decade. Based on history, the current Secular Bear could last as long as another decade. Notice this chart goes back to 1900.

Secular Stock Markets Explained

Below we show what the last Secular Bear Market looked like. This chart appeared in 5 of our quarterly portfolio commentaries before the waterfall in 2008. We continued to discuss these cycles so our investors were prepared for the possibilities. The last Secular Bear Market was about 16 years. We call the cycles oscillating up and down over time Cyclical Bull and Bear Markets. They typically last 1 - 4 years. At this point, the U.S. stock market has been in a defined Cyclical Bull Market since March 2009, however it is currently under pressure.

Secular Bear Market Example

You can probably see the risk of a passive strategy and the potential value of actively managing risk and dynamically adapting to these systematic directional price trends. It doesn't require perfection.The average uptrend was 38%, the average decline was -25%. It was 343% cumulative peak to trough drifts, an average of 21% a year.

From this wisdom, we have some understanding of what is possible. Sadly, investors who do not actively control their risk may experience more waterfall losses and possibly panic selling before the current Secular Bear is over.Of course, just "being" tactical isn't enough. Portfolio management is a craft that requires wisdom, skill, and experience. Like any craft, it's learned over time.

"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it"

- George Santayana

The Swings in a Secular Bear Market Are Much More Dramatic Than Most Investors Realize

The following chart is from my friend Ed Easterling at www.CrestmontResearch.com. I'm proud to say I was one of the very first to read and comment on Ed's book back in 2005: "Unexpected Returns". Prior to 2005, we had completed extensive research on historical Secular and Cyclical Bull and Bear Markets. Primarily, I had studied the trends going back over 100 years and tested tactical systems across those various trends. Our conclusion was that long term (Secular) Bull and Bear market's had occurred over and over throughout history. When Ed came out with his research in his book, we compared notes. His work was more focused on why Secular trends occur and under what circumstances. "Unexpected Returns" is a necessary study to understand the big picture. I can tell you that it was my understanding of market trends that motivated us to create the money management systems we benefited from the past five years. You can probably see how the timing of Secular situation correlates with our tactical asset management style - we built the Ark before the flood.

Though we studied and tested decision-making systems on much more detailed data, I thought I would show what these trends look like. Clearly, the U.S. stock market has been in a Secular Bear Market for a decade. Based on history, the current Secular Bear could last as long as another decade. Notice this chart goes back to 1900.

Secular Stock Markets Explained

Below we show what the last Secular Bear Market looked like. This chart appeared in 5 of our quarterly portfolio commentaries before the waterfall in 2008. We continued to discuss these cycles so our investors were prepared for the possibilities. The last Secular Bear Market was about 16 years. We call the cycles oscillating up and down over time Cyclical Bull and Bear Markets. They typically last 1 - 4 years. At this point, the U.S. stock market has been in a defined Cyclical Bull Market since March 2009, however it is currently under pressure.

Secular Bear Market Example

You can probably see the risk of a passive strategy and the potential value of actively managing risk and dynamically adapting to these systematic directional price trends. It doesn't require perfection.The average uptrend was 38%, the average decline was -25%. It was 343% cumulative peak to trough drifts, an average of 21% a year.

From this wisdom, we have some understanding of what is possible. Sadly, investors who do not actively control their risk may experience more waterfall losses and possibly panic selling before the current Secular Bear is over.Of course, just "being" tactical isn't enough. Portfolio management is a craft that requires wisdom, skill, and experience. Like any craft, it's learned over time.

"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it"

- George Santayana

 

 

Benchmark-itis! Who Wants to Track This?

 

We hear people talking a lot about stock indices like the S&P 500 stock index, referring to the index more than just a proxy for stocks, but also an investment. What you see below is a monthly chart of the past 10 years for the S&P 500 stock index. It is an index that many investment managers benchmark. I look at this chart, and I wonder; Who wants this?
 

Ten Year Chart of the S&P 500 Stock Index

S&P 500 Stock Index 10 Years 6-6-2010 5-13-34 PM

Chart courtesy of eSignal

 

In August 2000 the S&P 500 index was as high as 1,525. On Friday, it closed at 1,064. This index is down -43% from were it was ten years ago. (1065 - 1525) / 1064 = -43%. We could say the same about its more recent high point in October 2007.

At Shell Capital, we don't benchmark indexes. Our objective is to earn as much profit as we can with a specific amount of absolute risk. We call this "absolute return" rather than "relative return". We do not have benchmark-itis and we avoid relativity.

 

Benchmark-itis! Who Wants to Track This?

We hear people talking a lot about stock indices like the S&P 500 stock index, referring to the index more than just a proxy for stocks, but also an investment. What you see below is a monthly chart of the past 10 years for the S&P 500 stock index. It is an index that many investment managers benchmark. I look at this chart, and I wonder; Who wants this?

Ten Year Chart of the S&P 500 Stock Index

S&P 500 Stock Index 10 Years 6-6-2010 5-13-34 PM

Chart courtesy of eSignal

In August 2000 the S&P 500 index was as high as 1,525. On Friday, it closed at 1,064. This index is down -43% from were it was ten years ago. (1065 - 1525) / 1064 = -43%. We could say the same about its more recent high point in October 2007.

At Shell Capital, we don't benchmark indexes. Our objective is to earn as much profit as we can with a specific amount of absolute risk. We call this "absolute return" rather than "relative return". We do not have benchmark-itis and we avoid relativity.